Interoperability is a crucial organizational capability that enables firms to manage information systems (IS) from heterogeneous trading partners in a value network. While interoperability has been discussed conceptually in the IS literature, few comprehensive empirical studies have been conducted to conceptualize this construct and examine it in depth. For instance, it is unclear how interoperability is formed and whether it can improve organizational performance. To fill the gap, we argue that interorganizational systems (IOS) standards are a key information technology infrastructure facilitating formation of interoperability. As an organizational ability to work with external trading partners, interoperability's development depends not only on capability building within firm boundaries but also on community readiness across firm boundaries. Using data collected from 194 organizations in the geospatial industry, we empirically confirm that interoperability is formed via these two different paths. Furthermore, our results show that interoperability acts as a mediator by enabling firms to achieve performance gains from IOS standards adoption. Our study sheds new light on formation mechanisms as well as the business value of interoperability.
Peer-to-peer sharing networks have seen explosive growth recently. In these networks, sharing files is completely voluntary, and there is no financial reward for users to contribute. However, many users continue to share despite the massive free-riding by others. Using a large-scale data set of individual activities in a peer-topeer music-sharing network, we seek to understand users' continued-sharing behavior as a private contribution to a public good. We find that the more benefit users "get from" the network, in the form of downloads, browses, and searches, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Also, the more value users "give to" the network, in the form of downloads by other users and recognition by the network, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Moreover, our findings suggest that, overall, "getting from" is a stronger force for the continued-sharing decision than "giving to."
E-business standards are a key infrastructure for electronic commerce. In many industries, they are collaboratively developed by firms in an open and neutral industry consortium. It is imperative to understand what drives firms' resource investments in such consortia, as they are critical for the success of e-business standardization. Based on collective action theory, we propose a research model to investigate the drivers of standard development within consortia. We test the model through a data set of 232 firms from 7 consortia. Consistent with collective action theory, our results demonstrate that firms' interests, resource availability, and consortium management effectiveness jointly determine their resource expenditures within the consortium. However, our exploratory investigation indicates differences between vendors and users, as vendors are more motivated by perceived standard benefits whereas users are more motivated by perceived process benefits. Our research provides a deeper understanding of firms' behaviors within consortia and factors driving their standard making.
E-business standards are critical for electronic interorganizational transactions. In many industries, firms develop e-business standards collaboratively in a standard consortium. They can choose to become a leading developer, a passive adopter, or a nonadopter. To capture firms' strategic choices at the development stage and the adoption stage, which are related due to the double-sided interactions between the two stages, we propose an integrated model of consortium-based e-business standardization. We find that firms' payoffs from standard adoption increase with the intrinsic value of the standard, but developers' benefits increase faster than passive adopters' benefits. The model examines the value of passive adopters to the standard development via network externalities, even though passive adopters do not contribute directly in the consortium. We find that passive adopters do not always exist. There are two possible equilibria for the endogenous formation of the developer network and the adopter network, one without passive adopters and one with passive adopters. How external conditions affect the endogenous formation of the consortium depends upon whether there are passive adopters in the equilibrium. Based on our analysis, we recommend strategies to e-business standard consortia to motivate firms' participation and enhance social welfare created by the standard.